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Abstract
In the light of his recent (and fully deserved) Nobel Prize, this pedagogical paper 
draws attention to a fundamental tension that drove Penrose’s work on general rela-
tivity. His 1965 singularity theorem (for which he got the prize) does not in fact 
imply the existence of black holes (even if its assumptions are met). Similarly, his 
versatile definition of a singular space–time does not match the generally accepted 
definition of a black hole (derived from his concept of null infinity). To overcome 
this, Penrose launched his cosmic censorship conjecture(s), whose evolution we 
discuss. In particular, we review both his own (mature) formulation and its later, 
inequivalent reformulation in the pde literature. As a compromise, one might say 
that in “generic” or “physically reasonable” space–times, weak cosmic censorship 
postulates the appearance and stability of event horizons, whereas strong cosmic 
censorship asks for the instability and ensuing disappearance of Cauchy horizons. 
As an encore, an “Appendix” by Erik Curiel reviews the early history of the defini-
tion of a black hole.
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Conformal diagram [146, p. 208, Fig.  37]: ‘The Kruskal picture with conformal 
infinity represented.’ Penrose usually drew his own figures in a professional, yet 
playful and characteristic way.
1  Historical Introduction
Roger Penrose got half of the 2020 Physics Nobel Prize ‘for the discovery that black 
hole formation is a robust prediction of the general theory of relativity’. This prize 
was well deserved, since, jointly with Hawking and others, Penrose has shaped 
our (mathematical) thinking about general relativity (gr) and black holes since the 
1960s–1970s. He would also deserve the Abel Prize for this, shared with Yvonne 
Choquet-Bruhat: their combination would highlight the fact that two originally dis-
tinct traditions in the history of mathematical gr have now converged. In the wake 
of the work of Einstein [72], these traditions may be said to have originated with 
Hilbert [100] and Weyl [182, 183], respectively, as follows.
It would be fair to say that Hilbert mainly looked at gr from the point of view 
of pdes,1 whereas Weyl—once Hilbert’s PhD student in functional analysis—had a 
more geometric view, combined with an emphasis on causal structure. These dif-
ferent perspectives initially developed separately, in that the causal theory did not 
rely on the pde theory whilst for a long time the pde results were local in nature. 
Penrose contributed decisively to the causal approach to gr, with its characteristic 
emphasis on the conformal structure,2 i.e. the equivalence class of the metric ten-
sor g under a rescaling g(x) ↦ e(x)g(x) , with  an arbitrary smooth function of 
space and time. Though Weyl [183, p. 397], mentions the analogy with Riemann 
1 See Stachel [173] for an analysis of Hilbert’s contribution, as well as for the history of the Cauchy 
problem of gr up to Choquet-Bruhat, whose contributions were reviewed by Ringström [157] as well as 
by herself [27, 28].
2 Inspired by special rather than general relativity, Robb [158, 159], Reichenbach [154], Zeeman [187], 
and others axiomatized causal structure as a specific partial order, as Penrose knew well.
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surfaces,3 his real argument for conformal invariance was that what he calls Reine 
Infinitesimalgeometrie must go beyond Riemannian geometry, which (so he thinks) 
suffers from the inconsistency that parallel transport of vectors (through the metric 
or Levi–Civita connection, a concept Weyl himself had co-invented) preserves their 
length. This makes length of vectors an absolute quantity, which a ‘pure infinitesi-
mal geometry’ or a theory of general relativity should not tolerate. To remedy this, 
Weyl introduced the idea of gauge invariance, in that the laws of nature should be 
invariant under the above rescaling. To this end, he introduced what we now call a 
gauge field  = dx and a compensating transformation (x) ↦ (x) − (x) , 
and identified  with the electromagnetic potential (i.e. A). Dancing to the music 
of time, he then proposed that the pair (g,) describes all of physics. The idea of 
gauge symmetry has lasted and forms one of the keys to modern high-energy phys-
ics and quantum field theory: though misplaced in the classical gravitational con-
text in which he proposed it,4 through the Standard Model it has ironically become a 
cornerstone of non-gravitational quantum physics!
The conformal structure of a Lorentzian manifold determines the light cones, and 
as such Weyl was not the only author to discuss causal structure. For example, Ein-
stein [73] himself wondered if gravitational waves propagate with the speed of light, 
and showed this in a linear approximation; Weyl mentions this also.5 The themes 
of gravitational radiation, conformal invariance, and causal order were combined 
and came to a head in the work of Penrose,6 who also received additional inspira-
tion from the Dutch artist M.C. Escher and the spinor theory of Dirac. In Penrose 
[142–146, 148] he introduced most of the global causal techniques and topological 
ideas that are now central to any serious mathematical analysis of both gr and Lor-
entzian geometry [135, 139]. An important exception is global hyperbolicity, which 
has its roots in the work of Leray [123] and was adapted to gr by Choquet-Bruhat 
[25] and Geroch [87]. Global hyperbolicity is the main concept through which the 
causal theory meets the pde theory, but Penrose hardly worked on the pde side.7
The second piece of history one needs in order to understand Penrose’s contribu-
tions that are relevant to his Nobel Prize, is astrophysical. Briefly:8 relatively light 
stars retire as white dwarfs, in which nuclear burning has ended and inward gravi-
tational pressure is stopped by a degenerate electron gas. In 1931 Chandrasekhar 
3 Riemann surfaces may equivalently be defined as either one-dimensional complex manifolds or as two-
dimensional Riemannian manifolds up to conformal equivalence. Modestly, Weyl does not cite his own 
decisive contribution to their theory [181]. This equivalence undoubtedly also influenced Penrose’s work 
on gr and its derivatives like twistor theory.
4 See Einstein’s negative reaction to Weyl [183] in Einstein [74, Doc. 8]. See also Goenner [93, §4.1.3].
5 See e.g. p. 251 of the English translation of the fourth edition of Raum - Zeit - Materie (Weyl, 1922).
6 This history largely remains to be written (Dennis Lemkuhl is working on this). For now, see e.g. 
Thorne [175], Frauendiener [81], Friedrich [83], Wright [184, 185], and Ellis [76]. Furthermore, both the 
written AIP interview by Lightman [125] and the videotaped interview by Turing’s biographer Hodges 
[103] are great and intimate portraits of Penrose.
7 Although he was well aware of it: the singularity theorem in Penrose [144] assumes the existence of a 
Cauchy surface.
8 See Israel [109], Luminet [130], Thorne [175], Melia [133], Sanders [165], Curiel [49], and Falcke 
[78] for history, and Misner et al. [136], Joshi [110, 111], Poisson [153], and Weinberg [180] for theory.
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discovered that this works only for masses m ≤ 1.46M⊙ , where M⊙ is the solar mass. 
Heavier stars collapse into neutron stars (typically after a supernova explosion), but 
also these have an upper bound on their mass, as first suggested by Oppenheimer 
and Volkoff (1939); the current value is about 2.3M⊙ . Stars that are more massive 
cannot stop their gravitational collapse and unless they get rid of most of their mass/
energy they collapse completely.9 But what does this mean mathematically?
Most of the early intuition came from the Schwarzschild solution, seen as a 
model of the final state of such a collapse. This solution is spherically symmetric, 
and by Birkhoff’s theorem any such vacuum solution must be Schwarzschild (or 
Minkowski). It has two very notable features, namely curvature singularity as r → 0 
and an event horizon at r = 2m . Here it should be mentioned that initially both 
caused great confusion, even among the greatest scientists involved such as Einstein 
and Hilbert, though Lemaître was ahead of his time.10 Apart from their exact loca-
tions, these two features, then, may be taken to be the defining characteristics of a 
black hole, but especially the event horizon, which is held to be responsible for the 
“blackness” of the “hole”. However, even short of a correct technical understand-
ing of these features, from the 1920s until the 1950s most leading researchers in 
gr (including Einstein, Eddington, as well as Landau’s school in the Soviet Union, 
which covered all of theoretical physics) felt that at least the singularity was an arti-
fact of the perfect spherical symmetry of the solution (and likewise for the big bang 
as described by the spherically symmetric Friedman/flrw solution). This negative 
view also applied to the first generally relativistic collapse model (Oppenheimer and 
Snyder, 1939), now seen as groundbreaking, which is spherically symmetric and 
therefore terminates in the Schwarzschild solution.
The achievement usually attributed to Penrose [144], culminating in his Nobel 
Prize, is that he settled (in the positive) the question whether a more general (i.e. 
non-spherically symmetric) collapse of sufficiently heavy stars (etc.) also leads to 
a black hole. But if anyone understood this was not the case for the construal of a 
black hole as an astrophysical object with event horizon, it was Penrose himself! He 
must have been the first to recognize that his singularity theorem from 1965 did not 
prove the existence of black holes; under suitable hypotheses (involving both the 
concentration of matter and the causal structure of space–time) it proved merely the 
existence (but not even the precise nature or location) of incomplete null geodesics. 
As such, this implies neither the existence of a curvature singularity (not even if the 
solution is close to Schwarzschild), nor that of an event horizon. Leaving the former 
aside for the moment, the latter became the topic of what is now called the weak 
cosmic censorship conjecture:11
11 It is worth stressing that Penrose included a genericity restriction right from the beginning, pace 
Dafermos [52, p. 55]. The emphasis on initial data in the second formulation does not recur in the strong 
version of cosmic censorship below, but it is unavoidable in any form of weak cosmic censorship in order 
9 Supermassive black holes like Sagittarius A* and M87* are probably formed by mergers and accretion 
rather than collapse.
10 See Tipler et al. [176], Godart [92], Eisenstaedt [75], Thorne [175], Earman [66, 68], and Earman and 
Eisenstaedt [71]. Our understanding of the event horizon as a one-way membrane is usually attributed to 
Finkelstein [79].
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We are thus presented with what is perhaps the most fundamental question 
of general-relativistic collapse theory, namely: does there exist a “cosmic cen-
sor” who forbids the appearance of naked singularities, clothing each one in an 
absolute event horizon? In one sense, a “cosmic censor” can be shown not to 
exist. For it follows from a theorem of Hawking that the “big bang” singularity 
is, in principle, observable. But it is not known whether singularities observ-
able from outside will ever arise in a generic collapse which starts off from a 
perfectly reasonable nonsingular initial state. [147, p. 1162]
A system which evolves, according to classical general relativity with reason-
able equations of state, from generic non-singular initial data on a suitable 
Cauchy hypersurface, does not develop any spacetime singularity which is vis-
ible from infinity. [149, p. 618]
Following Penrose [149] we give a precise mathematical version in Sect. 2, but in 
any case it should be clear that in order to prove the existence of black holes from 
suitable assumptions one needs both Penrose’s singularity theorem (which gives at 
least some kind of singularity) and the weak cosmic censorship hypothesis (which 
gives the event horizon): the latter is the missing link between theorem and reality.
Expanding the scope of cosmic censorship, Penrose [149, p. 619], subsequently 
argued that:
It seems to me to be comparatively unimportant whether the observer himself 
can escape to infinity. Classical general relativity is a scale-invariant theory, 
so if locally naked singularities occur on a very tiny scale, they should also, 
in principle, occur on a very large scale in which a ‘trapped’ observer could 
have days or even years to ponder upon the implications of the uncertainties 
introduced by the observations of such a singularity. (...) Indeed, for inhabit-
ants of recollapsing closed universes (as possibly we ourselves are) there is no 
‘infinity’, so the question of being locally ‘trapped’ is one of degree rather than 
principle. It would seem, therefore, that if cosmic censorship is a principle of 
Nature, it should be formulated in such a way as to preclude such locally naked 
singularities.
This ban is called strong cosmic censorship, which as first shown by Penrose [149] 
himself, comes down to the requirement of global hyperbolicity (see Sect. 3). How-
ever: global hyperbolicity of which space–time?
More generally, in Penrose’s singularity theorem as well as in his two versions 
of cosmic censorship, it is ambiguous to which space–times the theorem and the 
hypothesis are applied. Traditionally, in gr one typically studied analytically 
extended solutions to the Einstein equations like—in the context of black holes—the 
Kruskal extension of the Schwarzschild solution, and similarly (but now not doubled 
to exclude the naked big bang singularity from the conjecture: the point of the second (1979) formulation 
is that the singularity lies to the future of the Cauchy hypersurface in question.
Footnote 11 (continued)
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but “infinitely extended”) for Reissner–Nordström and Kerr. The pde approach to gr, 
on the other hand, is based on two slogans, appealing to the fundamental theorem of 
Choquet-Bruhat and Geroch [29]:12
• All valid assumptions are about initial data;
• All valid questions are about the maximal globally hyperbolic development 
(mghd) thereof.
This clearly affects strong cosmic censorship, in that asking that a physically reason-
able space–time be globally hyperbolic is now deemed empty, since the mghd of any 
initial data automatically has this property. For similar reasons also Penrose’s ver-
sion of weak cosmic censorship needs to be reformulated. His singularity theorem 
does make sense for both traditional solutions and mghd, but the cause of geodesic 
incompleteness is quite different is these two cases (except for the Kruskal solution).
Written about and by a mathematician, we start in Sect.  2 with definitions. In 
Sect. 3 we trace the evolution of Penrose’s idea of cosmic censorship, which is illus-
trated by three black hole examples in Sect. 4. In the last section Sect. 5, the whole 
story culminates in Penrose’s amazing and influential final state conjecture. The 
conclusion is that although arguably Penrose did not quite achieve what the Nobel 
Prize committee says, he developed most of the techniques, saw the need for sin-
gularity theorems (of which he proved the first) as well as cosmic censorship, and, 
perhaps most importantly, showed the way to others.13 Finally, an Appendix written 
by Erik Curiel traces the definitional history of the concept of a black hole.
12 A Cauchy surface in a space–time (M,  g) is a subset Σ ⊂ M such that each endless timelike curve 
intersects Σ exactly once. This makes Σ a closed connected 3d submanifold of M which can be cho-
sen space-like and hence Riemannian. A space–time is globally hyperbolic if it has a Cauchy surface. 
Non-characteristic initial values for the Einstein equations form a triple (Σ, h,K) , i.e. a 3d Riemannian 
manifold (Σ, h) equipped with an additional symmetric tensor Kij , satisfying four constraint equations. A 
Cauchy development of such initial data is a triple (M, g, i), where (M, g) is a 4d space–time solving the 
Einstein equations, and i ∶ Σ → M is an embedding such that i∗g = h and i(Σ) is a Cauchy surface in M 
with extrinsic curvature K. Hence (M, g) is globally hyperbolic. Choquet-Bruhat and Geroch [29] showed 
that there exists a Cauchy development of the given (Σ, h,K) , called the maximal globally hyperbolic 
development (mghd), that is maximal as a globally hyperbolic space–time solving the Einstein equations 
with Cauchy surface i(Σ) and given (h, K). This mghd is unique up to time-orientation-preserving iso-
metries preserving Σ , i.e. if (M, g, i) and (M�, g�, i�) qualify then there is an isometry  ∶ M → M� such 
that ◦i = i� . See Choquet-Bruhat [26] and Ringström [156] for introductions to the pde approach, sup-
plemented by Sbierski [166]. See also [41]
13 In particular, using the pde approach Christodoulou [31, 33, 34] finally established the formation of 
black holes both in spherically symmetric collapse models with (scalar field) matter and in vacuum solu-
tions through focusing of gravitational waves, by proving both causal geodesic incompleteness and the 
existence of an event horizon. See also follow-ups by Klainerman and Rodnianski [116] and Klainerman 
et al. [114], and reviews by Bieri [12] and Dafermos [52]. For the incorporation of more realistic matter 
models see e.g. Burtscher and LeFloch [14] and Burtscher [13].
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2  Definitions
In mathematical physics it is essential to start from definitions that are physically 
relevant, mathematically precise, and workable. Penrose had a remarkable gift for 
this.14 For our purpose, i.e. what to make of the citation for his Nobel Prize, Penrose 
contributed at least five great definitions to gr, namely of:
• Null infinity, in turn implying a definition of an event horizon and hence of a 
black hole;
• Trapped surfaces, formalizing the condition that gravity is strong enough to 
focus light-rays;
• Singularities in space–time, which he characterized through incomplete causal 
geodesics;
• Weak cosmic censorship, stating that space–time singularities are covered by 
event horizons;
• Strong cosmic censorship, forbidding even nearby causal contact with space–
time singularities.
In this section we explain the first three definitions, leaving the last two for a sepa-
rate section (Sect. 3).15
15 Unexplained notions may be found in the standard gr textbooks such as Wald [179] or Chruściel [38]. 
A space–time (M, g) is a 4d connected time-orientable Lorentzian manifold with time orientation, i.e. 
the metric has signature (− + ++) and one has a way of distinguishing past from future by selecting, at 
each point in a continuous and consistent way, a forward and a backward light-cone. This leads to one 
of Penrose’s most effective notations, namely the relation J ⊂ M ×M , where (x, y) ∈ J , also written as 
y ∈ J+(x) or x ∈ J−(y) or x ≤ y , iff there exists a future-directed (fd) causal curve from x to y. For A ⊂ M 
we write J±(A) = ∪x∈AJ±(x) . Similarly, I ⊂ M ×M is defined by replacing ‘causal’ by ‘timelike’; one 
writes x ≪ y iff (x, y) ∈ I.
14 Penrose was clearly very good at capturing the general spirit of the time in mathematical concepts; 
this is why his ideas so quickly became mainstream, despite the unfamiliarity of even theoretical physi-
cists at the time with a field like topology (see [175, Chap. 13], which describes Penrose’s role in the 
gr community). But he did so in his own unique individual way: ‘It was important for me always, if I 
wanted to work on a problem, to think I had a different angle on it from other people. Because I wasn’t 
good at following where everybody else went. I wasn’t the kind of person who could pick up the preva-
lent arguments and knowledge of the time. Other people were good at that. They could suck it all out and 
put it together and make advances. I was the kind of person who’d have some kind of quirky way of look-
ing at something on my own, which I would hide away and work at. So it meant that I had to have some 
way of looking at a problem that was my own’ [125].
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2.1  Null Infinity
Null infinity and the ensuing concept of a black hole are predicated on the following 
concept:16
Definition 2.1 
1. A conformal completion of a space–time (M, g) is a space–time (M̃, g̃) , where 
M̃ is a manifold with boundary, with an embedding 𝜄 ∶ M ↪ M̃ such that 
𝜄(M) = intM̃) ∶= M̃�𝜕M̃ , and  is conformal in that 𝜄∗g̃ = (𝜄∗Ω2)g for some smooth 
positive function Ω ∶ M̃ → ℝ+ that satisfies: 
2. (M, g) is asymptotically flat at null infinity if it has a conformal completion (M̃, g̃) 
for which: 
(a) 𝜕M̃ = I+ ∪I− , where I± ∶= 𝜕M̃ ∩ J±(M) , with J±(M) computed in M̃;
(b) The Ricci tensor of the original metric g is such that R = O(Ω3) pointwise 
near 𝜕M̃.
In clause 2 and in what follows we tacitly identify M with (M) . Here are some 
comments on this clause. 
2(a) The boundary I  (pronounced, as Penrose suggests, “scri”) is called null 
infinity. Its components I+ and I− are called future null infinity and past null 
infinity, respectively. The idea is that I+ ( I− ) consists of limit points of future 
(past) directed null curves along which r → ∞.
2(a) Asking O(Ω3) is on the safe side (one might ask O(Ω2+) for 1∕2 < 𝜀 ≤ 1 ), 
and implies that Ω−2R extends by continuity from (M) to zero on 𝜕M̃ , as in 
R(r) ∼ 1∕r
3 as r → ∞ . The simplest way to satisfy this is to assume that (M, g) 
solves the vacuum Einstein equations R = 0 ; in the presence of matter one 
equivalently asks that T be O(Ω3).
(2.1)Ω > 0 on 𝜄(M); Ω = 0 on 𝜕M̃; ∇̃Ω ≠ 0 on 𝜕M̃.
16 See originally Penrose [143], who—in the context of gravitational waves—adds the condition that 
every null geodesic has two end-points on 𝜕M̃ , defining (M, g) to be asymptotically simple. In that case 
each connected component of 𝜕M̃ is diffeomorphic to ℝ × S2 , as is often the case even more generally 
(and as such is sometimes included in Definition 2.1). See also Hawking and Ellis [98, §6.9], Geroch 
[88], Wald [179, §11.1], Penrose and Rindler [152, Chap. 9], Stewart [174, Chap. 3], Frauendiener [81], 
Valiente Kroon [177], and Chruściel [39, §3.1]. The question how Definition 2.1 relates to asymptotic 
flatness as defined through conditions on the metric, either in space–time (4d) or in the initial value prob-
lem (3d), is very subtle; smoothness of (M̃, g̃) implies detailed fall-off (or ‘peeling’) properties of the 
Weyl tensor at infinity. See e.g. Geroch [88], Stewart [174], Klainerman and Nicolò [115], Friedrich [82, 
84], Adamo et al. [1], Dafermos [52], Chruściel and Paetz [45], and Paetz [141]. However, for the usual 
stationary black hole solutions and more generally for stationary space–times satisfying standard energy 
conditions the boundary is smooth [40].
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A crucial fact, noted (mutatis mutandis) without proof in Penrose [143, 146], is 
that:17
Proposition 2.2 On the boundary 𝜕M̃ the scaling function Ω satisfies the eikonal 
equation
so that 𝜕M̃ (more precisely: each connected component thereof) is a null hypersur-
face in M̃.18
Proof A simple computation, based on a conformal rescaling of the Ricci tensor,19 
shows that
Since g̃ is regular on 𝜕M̃ (where Ω = 0 ) and R = O(Ω3) gives R = O(Ω) , Eq. (2.2) 
follows.   ◻
Following Hawking and Penrose—we leave the tangled history to the Appen-
dix—we may then define
called the black hole region and the white hole region in M, respectively; each con-
nected component of B , if not empty, is then simply a black hole.20 It can be shown 
that J∓(I±) is open.21 The boundaries








(2.4)B ∶= M�J−(I+); W ∶= M�J+(I−),




17 If R = g , then g̃(∇̃Ω, ∇̃Ω) = −
1
3
𝜆 on 𝜕M̃ , so that ∇̃Ω is timelike and hence 𝜕M̃ is spacelike if 
𝜆 > 0 , and vice versa if 𝜆 < 0 [143, Lecture II], [146, p. 181]. See Ashtekar et al. [6] and Ashtekar and 
Magnon [8], respectively, for these cases. But as the king of null geometry in gr, Penrose must have 
taken special pleasure in  = 0!
18 Short of the very subtle regularity issues discussed in footnote 16, the boundary I  is smooth, and 
points like i± and i0 , typically included in Penrose diagrams, are not part of it. However, if one is inter-
ested in spatial infinity [4, 5, 88] one could extend the definition of a conformal completion so as to 
include these points.
19 It is easily verified by direct computation, and found in many books [177, §5.2.2], [39, Appendix 
H.6] that if g� = 2g , then R�

= R − 
−1(2∇∇ + gΔg) + 
−2(4∇∇ − gg(∇,∇)) . 
Now replace g′ ⇝ g and g ⇝ g̃ , so that  = 1∕Ω . This gives 
R𝜇𝜈 = R̃𝜇𝜈 + Ω
−1(2∇̃𝜇∇̃𝜈Ω + g̃𝜇𝜈Δg̃ Ω) − 3Ω
−2g̃(∇̃Ω, ∇̃Ω)g̃𝜇𝜈 , where ∇̃ = g̃𝜌𝜎∇̃𝜌∇̃𝜎 . This is eq. (11.1.16) 
in Wald [179], which immediately yields (2.3).
20 See the Appendix by Erik Curiel for historical information on this definition. See also Thorne [175, 
Chap. 7].
21 Since I∓(I±) ∩M = J∓(I±) ∩M , one could have used I instead of J in (2.4); see Wald [179, p. 308].
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decompose into the future and past event horizons of each of the black and white 
holes in M respectively. Since the hole regions B and W  are closed, the event hori-
zons form part of the black/white holes.
The analysis of such space–times is greatly facilitated by Penrose’s conformal 
diagrams,22 now called Penrose diagrams.23 These became an important tool for 
visualizing black holes [20, 98]. The title page shows one of the first such diagrams, 
drawn by Penrose himself.
However, the above definition of a black hole, though mathematically sweet, is 
not uncontroversial:
This definition depends on the whole future behaviour of the solution; given 
the partial Cauchy surface S(),24 one cannot find where the event horizon is 
without solving the Cauchy problem for the whole future development of the 
surface.’ (Hawing and Ellis, 1973, p. 319)
[The future event horizon] is the boundary of an interior spacetime region 
from which causal signals can never be sent to the asymptotic observers, no 
matter how long they are prepared to wait. The region is therefore “black” in 
an absolute sense.’ [7, p. 2]
The idea that nothing can escape the interior of a black hole once it enters 
makes implicit reference to all future time–the thing can never escape no mat-
ter how long it tries. Thus, in order to know the location of the event horizon 
in spacetime, one must know the entire structure of the space–time, from start 
to finish, so to speak, and all the way out to infinity. As a consequence, no 
local measurements one can make can ever determine the location of an event 
horizon. That feature is already objectionable to many physicists on philosoph-
ical grounds: one cannot operationalize an event horizon in any standard sense 
of the term. Another disturbing property of the event horizon, arising from its 
22 These confirm what Penrose often says, namely that he prefers to think in terms of pictures. Since 
Penrose started in algebraic geometry as a PhD student of Hodge in Cambridge, he was undoubtedly 
influenced by the theory of Riemann surfaces in finding this concept (like Weyl, as mentioned in the his-
torical introduction). For example, mutatis mutandis the closed Poincaré disk is a Penrose diagram of the 
Poincaré upper half plane. Penrose must also have been influenced by the famous Circle Limit woodcuts 
by Escher (nos. I–IV, dating from 1958 to 1960). See also Wright [184, 185].
23 Or, sometimes, Penrose–Carter diagrams. Carter himself speaks of PC-diagrams, perhaps tongue-in-
cheek saying that PC stands for Projective Conformal. See Chruściel [39, Chap. 6] for an axiomatic the-
ory of such diagrams. On a pragmatic case-by-case basis, construct and draw M̃ , suppress two-spheres, 
and use coordinates in which null geodesics are at ±45◦ , as in Minkowski space–time (indeed the ±45◦ 
idea goes back to Minkowski himself, who also drew his own diagrams).
24 A partial Cauchy surface Σ is an acausal edgeless subset of M [98, p. 204], [135, , p. 95]. This makes 
Σ a closed hypersurface in M which, because it is edgeless, is inextendible as an acausal set (though not 
necessarily maximal in M as such). A sufficient condition for the existence of a partial Cauchy surface 
is the existence of a time function; see Minguzzi [135, Theorems 3.39 and 4.100]. In the pde approach it 
arises when strong cosmic censorship fails, see Sect. 3.2, and a Cauchy surface for the mghd turns into a 
partial one for the extension. In that case Σ acquires a non-empty Cauchy horizon HC(Σ) = D(Σ) , where 
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global nature, is that it is prescient. Where I locate the horizon today depends 
on what I throw in it tomorrow–which future-directed possible paths of parti-
cles and light rays can escape to infinity starting today depends on where the 
horizon will be tomorrow, and so that information must already be accounted 
for today. Physicists find this feature even more troubling. [50, p. 29]
It is amusing how differently even top gr experts (and textbook authors!) respond to 
this charge:
[The above definition of an event horizon] is probably very useless, because it 
assumes we can compute the future of real black holes, and we cannot. (Rov-
elli, quoted in [50, p. 30])
I have no idea why there should be any controversy of any kind about the def-
inition of a black hole. There is a precise, clear definition in the context of 
asymptotically flat spacetimes (...) I don’t see this as any different than what 
occurs everywhere else in physics, where one can give precise definitions 
for idealized cases but these are not achievable/measurable in the real world. 
(Wald, ibid., p. 32)
What seems at stake here is what may be called Earman’s Principle:
While idealizations are useful and, perhaps, even essential to progress in phys-
ics, a sound principle of interpretation would seem to be that no effect can be 
counted as a genuine physical effect if it disappears when the idealizations are 
removed. [69, p. 191]
Note that two kinds of idealizations are involved in the case of event horizons of 
black holes: 
1. The ability to know an entire space–time (M, g), either from initial data or by 
direct construction;
2. The construction of null infinity in terms of which black holes and event horizons 
are defined.
Rovelli’s comment seems to apply to the first point but Wald’s to the second, in 
which case they would not contradict each other. The need to idealize the idea (!) 
that an event horizon prevents sending signals from the singularity to observers 
“far away” by taking the latter to mean “at (null) infinity” arises because in gen-
eral any finite distance could potentially lie within the event horizon. For specific 
space–times like Kruskal or Kerr, the horizons H±
E
 as defined in (2.5) can be explic-
itly located in M without reference to (null) infinity.25 Even if the space–time is not 
25 This is different from the idealization in phase transitions and spontaneous symmetry breaking, where 
even in exactly solvable models one needs the idealization of the thermodynamic limit to have such 
effects, at least according to their official definition. See Butterfield [15] and [122, Chap. 10] for the way 
to deal with Earman’s principle in these cases.
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known explicitly, the event horizon (if it has one) by definition lies at some finite 
distance from the singularity (if it has one). Hence in locating the horizon, the 
phrase “at infinity” could be replaced by “sufficiently far away” (from the singu-
larity), which agrees with Earman’s principle—and therefore Wald’s stance seems 
valid provided it concerns the second point.
On the other hand, the second point is predicated on the first, which remains 
unresolved. Thus we are entering an almost axiomatic approach to gr here, liable 
to the famous charge that it has ‘the advantages of theft over honest toil’ [163, p. 
71]. However, nothing is wrong with an axiomatic approach as long as one can find 
realistic models for the axioms (or definitions) that show that they are reasonable. 
This is the case in Penrose’s approach. The fact that we cannot ‘compute the future 
of black holes’ does not disqualify the event horizon as an object of nature we can 
prove theorems about (whose desirability may be different for theoretical and math-
ematical physicists). What is worrying is the precise relationship between the black 
hole “shadow” in the EHT image of M87* and the event horizon as defined by (2.5), 
which we cannot possibly know now.26 This raises epistemological questions about 
the role of theory in observation, which will not even be addressed here, let alone 
answered. See also Franklin [80].
2.2  Trapped Surfaces
In their excellent review of Penrose’s 1965 singularity theorem, Senovilla and Gar-
finkle [171] explain that all singularity theorems in gr share the following three 
assumptions (we quote verbatim): 
 (i) a condition on the curvature;
 (ii) a causality condition;
 (iii) an appropriate initial and/or boundary condition.
In Penrose [144] condition (i) states that R𝜇𝜈?̇?𝜇?̇?𝜈 ≥ 0 along all null geodesics  . 
Condition (ii) states that the space–time be globally hyperbolic with non-compact 
Cauchy surface; the topological assumption reflects the idea that the theorem is sup-
posed to apply to black holes and hence to asymptotically flat space–times. His con-
dition (iii) is the existence of a closed trapped surface, which is one of the most 
important concepts in all of black hole (mathematical) physics.27 Here is Penrose’s 
own definition:
26 More precisely, where it was 53.5 million years ago. An additional complication is that (ignoring the 
rotation of M87* for simplicity) the edge of the disk is not the event horizon at r = 2m but the pho-
ton sphere at r = 3m , further dislocated by optical effects so that we actually see it at r =
√
27m , cf. 
Chruściel [38, §3.9.6], and Event Horizon Telescope Collaboration [77].
27 See initially Hawking [98, Chap. 9]. The study of trapped surface formation from the pde point of 
view began with Schoen and Yau [169], who gave initial values that already contain trapped surface; see 
also Alaee et al. [2]. Christodoulou [31, 32, 34] first proved the evolution of asymptotically flat initial 
data into trapped surfaces. Later literature may be traced back from Li and Yu [124] and Athanasiou and 
Lesourd [9]. See also references in Footnote 13.
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A trapped surface [is] defined generally as a closed, spacelike two-surface T2 
with the property that the two systems of null geodesics which meet T2 orthog-
onally converge locally in future directions at T2 . [144, p. 58]
In the presence of a radial coordinate r as in the Schwarzschild, Reissner–Nord-
ström, and Kerr solutions, this condition is equivalent to the (metric) gradient ∇r 
being timelike, which in the Schwarzschild solution happens for r < 2m , and which 
in the other two (subcritical) cases is the case at least for a while after crossing the 
event horizon. In general, the convergence condition can be stated in terms of the 
null hypersurface C generated by the future directed null congruence emanating 
from some (instantaneous) spacelike two-sphere S2 , so that C = S2 . In terms of a 
tetrad (e1, e2, L, L) with (e1, e2) spacelike and tangent to C , L null and tangent as well 
as orthogonal to C, and L null and pointing off C, normalized such that g(ei, ej) = ij , 
g(ei, L) = g(ei, L) = 0 for i, j = 1, 2 , and finally g(L, L) = −1 and of course 
g(L, L) = g(L, L) = 0 , all defined on C, null extrinsic curvatures are 2 × 2 matrices 
kij = g(∇jL(t), ei(t)) and kij = g(∇jL, ei) , with traces  = tr(k) and  = tr(k) . Then S
2 
is trapped iff 𝜃 < 0 and 𝜃 < 0 throughout S2 . This condition is local and there are 
none of the problems afflicting null infinity (cf. Sect. 2.1).
2.3  Singularities in Space–Time
Ironically, although this is also seen as one of Penrose’s most important contribu-
tions to gr (and was immediately recognized as such by his contemporaries like 
Hawking), his definition of a singular space–time (i.e. as being causally geodesi-
cally incomplete) has to be inferred from his proof by contradiction of his singular-
ity theorem in Penrose [144, 146], to the effect that properties (i), (ii), and (iii) of the 
previous subsection exclude the possibility that (M, g) is also future null geodesi-
cally complete.28
Hawking [95, §6.1], much more explicitly discusses the need for a good defini-
tion of a singular space–time, upon which he arrives at the contrapositive: ‘We shall 
say that M is singularity-free if and only if it is timelike and null geodesically com-
plete.’29 However, unlike Penrose [144, 146], Hawking, and later Hawking and Ellis 
[98, §8.1], emphatically apply this definition to the case where (M, g) is metrically 
inextendible, in that it cannot be isometrically embedded as an open submanifold 
of a larger space–time (M�, g�) , subject to certain regularity conditions on both the 
manifold and the metric. Adapting a definition given by Clarke [46, p. 10] (who 
however uses arbitrary curves) we may formalize this by:
28 A geodesic  , which we take by definition to be affinely parametrized, is called complete if it can be 
extended to arbitrary values of its parameter, i.e. is defined as a map  ∶ ℝ → M . It is future complete if 
it is defined as a map  ∶ [a,∞) → M for some a ∈ ℝ , etc. In the Riemannian case, by the Hopf–Rinow 
theorem geodesic completeness is equivalent to completeness in the topological metric d derived from 
the Riemannian metric g as the infimum over the path length (computed from g) of all curves connecting 
two given points. Since a Lorentzian metric no longer defines a topological metric, this result is lost.
29 As in Hawking and Ellis [98, §8.1], Penrose is not mentioned here but there is generic acknowledge-
ment in the Preface.
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Definition 2.3 A space–time is singular if it contains an incomplete causal geo-
desic  ∶ [0, a) → M such that there is no extension  ∶ M → M� for which ◦ is 
extendible.
This refinement of Penrose’s definition was originally proposed in order to avoid 
trivial cases: removing any point from Minkowski space–time makes it geodesically 
incomplete, but also think of Schwarzschild for r > 2m only. But with hindsight, we 
can say it makes a big difference to impose inextendibility also in nontrivial cases 
where strong cosmic censorship fails, as will be explained in due course. We there-
fore follow Penrose in defining a space–time to be singular iff it is causally geo-
desically incomplete, leaving it open whether it can be extended—indeed his 1965 
singularity theorem (or any later version thereof) gives no information about metric 
inextendibility at all. As we shall see, if the three conditions in Penrose’s singularity 
theorem hold, the cases where the space–time in question can or cannot be extended 
are quite different in so far as the nature of the incompleteness is concerned, and 
both cases are equally interesting. Even apart from this, Penrose’s definition is once 
again controversial; it ended a long period of confusion, but it did so at a price, as 
was recognized right from the start. As Geroch [86],30 p. 526, states:
(a) there is no widely accepted definition of a singularity in general relativity;
(b) each of the proposed definitions is subject to some inadequacy.
For example, the link between singularities and diverging curvature is lost, although 
this was the original intuition from both the Schwarzschild and the Friedman “sin-
gularities”. Furthermore, even within the confines of defining singularities through 
incomplete curves, singling out (causal) geodesics excludes some interesting 
space–times intuitively felt to be singular—but this can only be detected through the 
incompleteness of more general curves (Geroch [86, Appendix]). In fact, Penrose 
[149] did incorporate these at a later stage, as will be discussed in Sect. 3.1. But ulti-
mately we side with Hawking and Ellis:31
Timelike geodesic completeness has an immediate physical significance in that 
it presents the possibility that there could be freely moving observers or par-
ticles whose histories did not exist after (or before) a finite interval of proper 
time. This would appear to be an even more objectionable feature than infinite 
curvature and so it seems appropriate to regard such a space as singular. (...) 
The advantage of taking timelike and/or null incompleteness as being indica-
tive of the presence of a singularity is [also] that on this basis one can establish 
a number of theorems about their occurrence. [98, p. 258]
30 Further to this classical paper on singularities, see also Earman [66, 67], Senovilla [170], and Curiel 
[48, 49].
31 Reminiscent of the great slogan ‘A good definition should be the hypothesis of a theorem’ (attributed 
to J. Glimm).
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3  Cosmic Censorship
In this section we review Penrose’s original versions of cosmic censorship, followed 
by pde reformulations now in use. Penrose [149] gave a precise statement of strong 
cosmic censorship that seems almost forgotten, but translated this into an equivalent 
characterization in terms of global hyperbolicity that became very influential. Since 
only seasoned relativists will be able to relate global hyperbolicity to the original 
ideas behind cosmic censorship (as reviewed in the historical introduction), we first 
give a unified formulation of both weak and strong cosmic censorship along the 
lines of Penrose [149], (see also Penrose [150]).
3.1  Cosmic Censorship à la Penrose
Remarkably, where Penrose [144] defined singularities in terms of incomplete 
causal geodesics, Penrose [149] switches to endless timelike curves. It turns out 
that the change from ‘causal’ to ‘timelike’ does not matter,32 but the change from 
geodesics to curves is quite substantial.33 Forbidding signaling by singularities thus 
defined turns out to be equivalent to global hyperbolicity (of all of space–time in 
case of strong cosmic censorship and of J−1(I+) in the weak version), which is very 
neat and may justify this change. However, had the original definition in terms of 
causal geodesics been used, then presumably some weaker causality condition than 
global hyperbolicity would have been found.34
In any case, the basic problem is to express mathematically what it means for 
a signal to emanate from a singularity, since the latter is not part of space–time. 
Happily, it is precisely his own definition of singularities in terms of incomplete 
causal geodesics—now general causal curves—that enabled Penrose to overcome 
this problem, drawing on earlier work [90], as follows.
32 In the light of the analysis below, this follows from Theorem (2.3) in Geroch et al. [90].
33 Penrose’s timelike curves are smooth by convention [148, pp. 2–3]. Following Minguzzi [135], we 
prefer to work with continuous causal curves, which behave better under limits (e.g. smooth timelike 
curves typically converge uniformly, if they do, to continuous causal curves, whereas limits of the latter, 
if they exist, lie in the same class). We say that a continuous curve c ∶ I → M is causal if every point 
x = c(t) on the curve ( t ∈ I ) has a normal neigbourhood Ux such that the unique geodesic connecting 
x with any later point y ∈ Ux (with y = c(t�) for t′ > t ) is causal. To analyse such curves we introduce 
an auxiliary (complete) Riemannian metric h on M (which always exists), with associated topological 
metric dh defined as in Footnote 28, and defining things like absolute continuity etc. A continuous curve 
c ∶ I → M is causal iff (possibly after reparametrization) it is absolutely continuous and a.e. differenti-
able on I with ċ causal. Moreover, for [s, u] ∈ I the Riemannian length Lh(c�[s,u]) = ∫ us dt
√
h(ċn(t), ċn(t)) 
is well defined and finite. See e.g. Theorem 2.3.2 in Chruściel [37, §2.3], and Theorem A.1 in Candela 
et  al. [16]. Since the function u ↦ Lh(c|[s,u]) is strictly increasing and hence invertible, any continuous 
causal curve c may be parametrized by h-arc length. If an fd (i.e. future-directed) continuous causal 
curve c  :  [a, b) is parametrized by (or proportional to) h-arc length, then b = ∞ iff c is future endless 
[134, Lemmas 2.6 and 2.17].
34 It is the second (‘converse’) part of the proof of Theorem 3.2 below that does not work for causal geo-
desics instead of curves, since the curve  constructed there is not necessarily a geodesic. This goes back 
to the definition of domains of dependence and Cauchy surfaces in terms of causal curves rather than 
geodesics, and may explain Penrose’s [149] choices.
 Foundations of Physics           (2021) 51:42 
1 3
  42  Page 16 of 38
An endless causal curve may either be complete, i.e. have infinite length, or 
incomplete (finite length). In the first case it may either go off to infinity, or hover 
around in a compact set, which is impossible in a strongly causal space–time; 
hence Penrose makes this assumption. In the second case (also assuming  is future 
directed for simplicity) it may either be thought of as crashing into a singularity, or 
leading to the edge of an extendible space–time. If  is not endless but has a future 
endpoint y, then
If (M, g) is strongly causal, then I±(x) = I±(y) iff x = y . The idea, then, is that an 
endless (continuous) causal curve  corresponds to an ideal point y of space–time, 
which is not contained in M but is still defined by I−() , this time without (3.1). By 
the above case distinction, at least in strongly causal space–times ideal points may 
be either points at infinity, or singularities, or boundary points, respectively.35
Now, if  does have a future endpoint y ≠ x , the crucial condition I−(𝛾) ⊂ I−(x) 
occurring in Definition 3.1 below—albeit in the endless case—is evidently equiva-
lent to I−(y) ⊂ I−(x) , i.e. y ≪ x , which states that there exists an fd timelike curve 
or signal from y to x. If  is endless, on the other hand, there is no such point y, but 
we may still interpret (3.3) below as saying that timelike signals emanating from the 
ideal point y defined by  (such as a singularity), or from arbitrarily nearby points, 
can reach x. This exegesis also applies to the condition I−(𝛾) ⊂ J−(x) , in which case 
some causal curve from y reaches x.
The following definition then captures the two notions of cosmic censorship in 
Penrose [149].36 We recall that these definitions and the ensuing theorem presup-
pose that (M, g) is strongly causal.37
(3.1)I−() = I−(y).
35 Geroch et al. [90] and in their wake Hawking and Ellis [98, §6.8], show that (assuming strong causal-
ity) both real points and ideal points of M correspond to subsets U ⊂ M that are: (i) open, (ii), past sets, 
i.e. I−(U) ⊂ U , and (iii) indecomposable, in that U ≠ U1 ∪ U2 where U1 and U2 have properties (i) and 
(ii) and are neither empty nor equal to U. Such sets are called IP (for Indecomposable Past set), and those 
that are not of the form U = I−(x) for some x ∈ M are called TIP’s (for Terminal IP’s); these TIP’s are 
U = I−() for some future-endless timelike curve  . It would be more natural if strong cosmic censorship 
merely excluded visible TIP’s coming from incomplete curves, but Penrose [149] gives various argu-
ments for including complete curves  , too, and in any case his Theorem 3.2 holds only if all TIP’s are 
included.
36 See also Królak [119] for a different axiomatization of weak cosmic censorship à la Penrose, as well 
as useful analysis.
37 Strong causality is used through its implication that I±(x) = I±(y) iff x = y , without which Defini-
tion 3.1 would make little sense, as well as through its implication of non-total imprisonment, without 
which the invocation of Theorem 2.53 in Minguzzi [135] in the proof of Theorem 3.2 below would fail. 
It is also part of one of the traditional definitions of global hyperbolicity (namely strong causality plus 
compactness of causal diamonds J+(y) ∩ J−(x) ), but since the proof of Theorem 3.2 is based on contra-
dicting compactness of causal diamonds, in that role it is hardly necessary anymore, since Hounnonkpe 
and Minguzzi [104] proved that a non-compact space–time with dim(M) ≥ 3 is globally hyperbolic iff all 
double cones are compact.
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Definition 3.1 In both cases below, let  denote a future-directed future-endless 
causal curve.38
• A space–time (M, g) that is asymptotically flat at null infinity (Sect. 2.1) contains 
a naked singularity if there is a curve  as above, and a point x ∈ J−(I+) in its 
causal future in M̃ , in the sense that 
 Penrose’s weak cosmic censorship conjecture states that space–times that are 
asymptotically flat at null infinity and arise from “generic” regular initial condi-
tions contain no naked singularities.
• A space–time (M, g) contains a locally naked singularity if there is a curve  as 
above, and a point x ∈ M in its chronological future, in the sense that 
 Penrose’s strong cosmic censorship conjecture states that “generic” [in his 
own words: “physcially reasonable”] space–times do not contain locally naked 
singularities.
It should be defined precisely what “generic” means, lest these conjectures turn 
into a definition of genericity! Penrose did not do this, and we will return to this 
point in Sect. 3.2. It is important to realize that in this definition Penrose does not 
require  to be incomplete, but merely endless. Indeed the notion of (in)completeness 
is hard to define for non-geodesic curves since it depends on the parametrization; 
if, as we do, continuous causal curves are parametrized by arc length as measured 
by an auxiliary complete Riemannian metric (see Footnote 33), then the distinction 
between endlessness and incompleteness cannot even be made, because any end-
less curve has infinite arc length.39 Beyond moving from causal geodesics to general 
causal curves, this further generalization allows even more singularities, and has the 
effect of making the notion(s) of cosmic censorship more stringent—in excluding a 




38 There is a similar definition in terms of past-directed endless causal curves, in which I−(⋅) is replaced 
by I+(⋅) throughout. As far as strong cosmic censorship is concerned this definition turns out to be equiv-
alent to the given one, cf. Theorem 3.2, whilst for weak cosmic censorship the above definition is the 
appropriate one. Note that strong cosmic censorship does not imply weak cosmic censorship since (3.2) 
has J−(x) with x possibly in I+ ⊂ 𝜕M̃ , whilst (3.3) has I−(x) with x ∈ M.
39 Recall that affinely parametrized geodesics are incomplete iff they are endless and have finite param-
eter length.
40 The conditions (3.2) and (3.3) do make sense for complete future endless causal curves: for example, 
in anti-de Sitter space one has endless causal curves  and points x such that I−(𝛾) ⊂ J−(x) , but this space 
is not regarded as singular (it is a space–time of constant negative curvature). Penrose [149, p. 623], 
notes that this is impossible in space–times that are asymptotically flat at null infinity, and indeed anti-de 
Sitter space has a negative cosmological constant with timelike future null infinity.
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The following theorem, of which part 2 is due to Penrose [149] with a slightly 
different proof, and part 1 is an almost trivial addition, is the main characterization 
of cosmic censorship in his sense.
Theorem 3.2 
1. If (M, g) is asymptotically flat at null infinity, then it has no naked singularities 
iff the exterior region J−(I+) in M̃ (which by definition includes I+ ⊂ 𝜕M̃ ) is 
globally hyperbolic.41
2. In general, a space–time (M, g) has no locally naked singularities iff it is globally 
hyperbolic.
It should be clear intuitively that at least part 2 of the theorem is true (in the con-
trapositive): if a space–time contains a locally naked singularity, represented by  
as in Definition 3.1, then  will not reach any partial Cauchy-surface Σ lying in the 
future of x, since it crashes at the singularity lying in the past of x. Conversely, if no 
Cauchy surface exists then one can construct such a curve  . See also Sect. 4.
Proof We prove the inference from a locally naked singularity to non-global hyper-
bolicity by contradiction. Suppose that (3.3) holds for some  and x and that (M, g) 
is globally hyperbolic. Take y ∈  and then a future-directed sequence (yn) of points 
on  , with y0 = y . Because of (3.3) this sequence lies in J+(y) ∩ J−(x) , which is 
compact by assumption. Hence (yn) has a limit point z in J+(y) ∩ J−(x) . Now define 
curves (cn) as the segments of  from y to yn . By the curve limit lemma,42 these 
curves have a uniform limit, whose arc length (as measured by an auxiliary com-
plete Riemannian metric, see Footnote  33) is on the one hand infinite (since  is 
endless and hence has infinite arc length, which is approached as the yn move up 
along  ), but on the other hand is finite, since it must end at z (and fd continuous 
causal curves have finite arc length iff they have an endpoint). Hence (M, g) cannot 
be globally hyperbolic.43   ◻
41 Tipler et  al. [176, p. 176], made this the definition of weak cosmic censorship. It may be closer to 
Penrose’s [149] formulation to require x ∈ J−(I+) ∩ J+(Σ) in the first part of Definition  3.1, where 
Σ is some partial Cauchy surface in M, in which case Theorem  3.2 yields global hyperbolicity of 
J−(I+) ∩ J+(Σ) . This is similar to the condition I+ ⊂ D+(Σ) making (M,  g) future asymptotically 
predictable from Σ [98, p. 312], but is equivalent to it only under further regularity assumptions [119, 
Lemma 2.10]. See also Wald [179, §12.1] and Chruściel [39, §3.5.1]
42 One needs Theorem  2.53 in Minguzzi [135], of which part (i) applies: Let (cn ∶ [0, bn] → M) be a 
sequence of fd continuous causal curves parametrized by h-arc length in a non-imprisoning space–time 
such that cn(0) → x and cn(bn) → y ≠ x . Then there exists an fd continuous causal curve c ∶ [0, b] → M , 
where b < ∞ as well as a subsequence of (cn) that converges uniformly to c (including bn → b at the 
endpoint). Penrose [149] gives a more complicated argument, perhaps since the version of the curve limit 
lemma just cited was not available at the time, or because he wanted to use his TIP’s (which we avoid).
43 This also works for part 1, where x ∈ J−(I+) ), Eq. (3.2) also implies yn ∈ J+(y) ∩ J−(x) . Conversely, 
if there are x, y for which J−(x) ∩ J+(y) is not compact, one can easily construct a future-directed future-
endless causal curve  such that (3.3) holds for the given x [149, p. 624]. Since (3.3) trivially gives 
I−(𝛾) ⊂ J−(x) , also this implication works for part 1.
1 3
Foundations of Physics           (2021) 51:42  Page 19 of 38    42 
Especially its definition through the existence of a Cauchy surface relates global 
hyperbolicity to determinism, the idea being that any event in a globally hyperbolic 
space–time is determined by certain initial data on a Cauchy surface in it, at least as 
long as the (classical) universe is governed by hyperbolic partial differential equa-
tions. This is clearly true for the gravitational field itself (as long as it satisfies the 
Einstein equations), and also has considerable backing for other fields.44 This does 
not imply that non-globally hyperbolic space–times are necessarily indeterministic: 
the point is rather that signals from a (locally) naked singularity can reach an event 
without ultimately coming from a Cauchy surface, so that the event is influenced by 
data other than those at an initial-value surface. Thus the event in question may still 
be fully determined—but it is not determined by the initial data that were supposed 
to do so.45
Conversely, the flagrant indeterminism concerning the unknown fate of some-
one falling into a black hole singularity is compatible with global hyperbolicity (as 
in e.g. the Schwarzschild solution). Furthermore, suppose some globally hyper-
bolic space–time (M, g) solving the Einstein equations is metrically extendible (see 
Sect.  2.3), such that the extension (M�, g�) is either not globally hyperbolic at all, 
or is globally hyperbolic but not with respect to any Cauchy surface Σ in M. Then 
again, although all things in (M�, g�) may be determined, they are not determined by 
the initial data on Σ one expected to do so.46
3.2  Cosmic Censorship in the Initial Value (pde) Formulation
Definition 3.1 of the cosmic censorship conjectures is inappropriate from the point 
of view of the initial-value problem. Recall from Sect.  1 that in this approach all 
valid questions are about the maximal globally hyperbolic development (M, g, ) of 
initial data (Σ, h,K) . Since the mghd is always globally hyperbolic, the strong ver-
sion is trivial by Theorem 3.2. For weak cosmic censorship there is a subtle issue 
about which asymptotically flat initial data lead to mghd that are asymptotically flat 
at null infinity (see Footnote 16), but even granting this, the real problem is that even 
in clear counterexamples to the Penrosian conjecture (such as m < 0 Schwarzschild, 
see Sect. 4), the space J−(I+) computed for the mghd is globally hyperbolic. Thus 
the Penrosian version, applied to the mghd, would hold despite naked singularities!
There is no crystal-clear logical path from Penrose’s formulation of the cosmic 
censorship conjectures to the current versions used in the pde literature, but there is 
some continuity of ideas. First, as to the weak version, in order to strengthen Defini-
tion 2.1 (or rather some slight variation thereof) Geroch and Horowitz [89] proposed 
44 See e.g. Choquet-Bruhat [26] and Bär et al. [10], respectively, as well as Earman [66, 70].
45 The closest analogue to this generally relativistic situation occurs in non-relativistic mechanics, where 
bodies may disappear to infinity in finite time [164, 186], and hence, by the same (time-reversed) token, 
may appear from nowhere in finite time and hence influence affairs in a way unforeseeable from any 
Cauchy surface. See Earman [70, §3.6].
46 Doboszewski [63–65] analyzes the connection between global hyperbolicity, extendibility, and deter-
minism.
 Foundations of Physics           (2021) 51:42 
1 3
  42  Page 20 of 38
that future null infinity I+ be null geodesically complete.47 This was motivated by 
the following example. In light-cone coordinates, the standard conformal comple-
tion (̃, ?̃?) of Minkowski space–time (, ) , described for example in Penrose [146, 
pp. 175–177], is given by
Now on the one hand, truncating I+ to for example {










 instead of (3.5) would still define a conformal 
completion of (, ) , with respect to which the future light-cone J+(0) is a fake 
black hole B in  . On the other hand, removing B = J+(0) , the ensuing space–time 
(�J+(0), ) has a conformal completion (such as the one just described), which by 
design is free of black holes. In both undesirable cases future null infinity is incom-
plete (in the sense of Footnote 47).48
Completeness of future null infinity in the above sense, then, was taken to be 
the pde reformulation of weak cosmic censorship [32], although it turns the Penro-
sian version on its head! For whereas his version states that outgoing signals from a 
black hole singularity are blocked by an event horizon H+
E
 , the new version is about 
incoming (null) signals: the further these are away from H+
E
 , the longer it takes them 
to enter H+
E
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, (,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2 (p − q)
(
d𝜃2 + sin2 𝜃d𝜑2
)
;
(3.8)Ω = cos p cos q.
47 This condition is nontrivial to state; for example, in the metric ?̃? used below even I+ for the stand-
ard conformal completion (̃, ?̃?) of Minkowski space–time (, ) is incomplete. Completeness of curves 
depends on their parametrization. Geodesics are affinely parametrized by definition (and an affine repara-
metrization does not affect their (in)completeness), but a change in Ω changes the unphysical metric g̃ 
(for given physical metric g). Hence the notion of a geodesic and its (in)completeness depends on the 
choice of Ω . As recognized by Geroch and Horowitz [89] themselves, the correct approach is to use the 
freedom of rescaling Ω to ensure that ∇̃𝜇∇̃𝜈Ω = 0 on I
+ , and require null geodesic completeness of the 
null hypersurface I+ in this “gauge”, in which the flow of ∇̃Ω is geodesic. See also Wald [179, §11.1], or 
Stewart [174, §3.6].
48 This clause seems to be an improvement over an inextendibility condition proposed by Geroch [88], 
which did not exclude cases like (�J+(0), ) . However, inextendibility plus some regularity condition 
enabled Geroch [88] to prove uniqueness of conformal completions, a result that seems to have no ana-
logue for Definition 2.1, even in strengthened form.
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complete. Yet the pde version appears to strengthens Penrose’s: heuristically, and 
contrapositively, lack of global hyperbolicity of J−(I+) gives a partial Cauchy sur-
face Σ a Cauchy horizon which cuts off I+ , making it incomplete (this will perhaps 
be clearer from the examples in Sect. 4).49 Thus we obtain:
Definition 3.3 
• The weak cosmic censorship conjecture states that if “generic” complete initial 
data have a mghd that is asymptotically flat at null infinity, then future null infin-
ity is complete.
• The strong cosmic censorship conjecture states that the mghd of “generic” 
complete initial data is metrically inextendible (as a space–time in a regularity 
class to be specified in detail).
For convenience, we have added the strong version of cosmic censorship used in 
the pde approach, whose path from the Penrosian formulation we now try to trace.50 
First, in a paper on weak cosmic censorship, Moncrief and Eardley [138, p. 889], 
propose an ‘(informally stated) global existence conjecture’:
Every asymptotically flat initial data set with trK = 0 may be evolved to arbi-
trarily large times (...)
adding that its proof would ‘in essence prove the [weak] cosmic censorship conjec-
ture for asymptotically flat space–times’. For initial data given on a compact Cauchy 
surface they propose something similar, and in doing so they opened the door to 
regarding cosmic censorship as a global existence problem for the (vacuum) Ein-
stein equations, as indeed the title of their paper already expresses. In this spirit, 
Moncrief [137, p. 88], paraphrases Penrose’s strong version as expressed by Theo-
rem 3.2 as
i.e., that the maximal Cauchy development of a generic initial data set is inex-
tendible.
This is made more precise by Chruściel et  al. [43], who open their abstract as 
follows:
49 Christodoulou [32] actually reformulates the above definition of weak cosmic censorship in such a 
way that the idealization I+ no longer occurs. Let (Σ, h,K) be asymptotically flat initial data for the Ein-
stein equations (satisfying the constraints), with mghd (M, g, i). He then defines (M, g) to have “complete 
future null infinity” iff for any s > 0 there exists a region B0 ⊂ B ⊂ Σ such that D+(B) , which is ruled 
by null geodesics, has the property that each null geodesic starting in J+(B0) ∩ D+(B) can be future 
extended beyond parameter value s. Here D+(B) is the future domain of dependence of B, and each null 
geodesic in question is supposed to have tangent vector L = T − N , where T is the fd unit normal to Σ in 
M and N is the outward unit normal to B in Σ . See also Christodoulou and Klainerman [35] for back-
ground on these constructions.
50 I am greatly indebted to Juliusz Doboszewski for drawing my attention to the early papers by Mon-
crief et al.
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The strong cosmic censorship conjecture states that ‘most’ spacetimes devel-
oped as solutions of Einstein’s equations from prescribed initial data cannot be 
extended outside of their maximal domains of dependence.
They later (§3) specify the word ‘most’ in terms of open and dense subsets in the 
space of initial data.51
Chruściel [36] introduced the notion of a development of initial data (Σ, h,K) as a 
triple (M, g, i), where (M, g) is a 4d space–time solving the vacuum Einstein equa-
tions, and i ∶ Σ → M is an embedding such that i∗g = h and i(Σ) has extrinsic curva-
ture K; the difference from a Cauchy development (see Footnote 12) is that i(Σ) is no 
longer required to be Cauchy surface in M, so that (M, g) is not necessarily globally 
hyperbolic. He calls such a development maximal if there is no extension (M�, g�) 
that also satisfies the vacuum Einstein equations, and proves existence of maximal 
developments (but not uniqueness up to isometry, as in the globally hyperbolic case, 
cf. Footnote 12). Applying Penrose’s strong cosmic censorship to such a maximal 
development, he asks it to be globally hyperbolic. If this is the case, then—up to 
isometry as usual–(M, g) must coincide with the mghd of given initial data.52 Conse-
quently, this specific application of strong cosmic censorship à la Penrose is equiva-
lent to asking the mghd of given initial data to be inextendible as a solution to the 
vacuum (or any kind of) Einstein equations.53
Adding suitable regularity conditions on the extensions,54 this would be a mean-
ingful and natural pde version of strong cosmic censorship but the version used in 
the pde literature is stronger: one requires metric inextendibility of the mghd full 
stop, whether or not this extension satisfies the vacuum Einstein equations. And 
although it would make sense in general, in practice the ensuing conjecture is posed 
for either non-compact Σ with asymptotically flat initial data or compact Σ ; better 
safe than sorry!
The need for a restriction on the scope of the conjectures was clearly realized and 
stated—albeit purely qualitatively—already by Penrose himself (see Footnote 11). 
Indeed, without such a restriction some of the best-known exact black hole solu-
tions (cf. Sect. 4) provide counterexamples to one or both of the conjectures, as was 
of course well known to Penrose and his circle (for the Penrosian version, that is). 
To get around this, in one of his most prophetic insights, Penrose (1968, p. 222) 
51 Detailed mathematical criteria for genericity (which are suggested by pde theory and whose physical 
relevance is doubted outside the pde community) may be also be found for example in Dafermos [51] and 
Luk and Oh [127, §3].
52 Continuing Footnote  12, the set of isometry classes [M,  g,  i] of Cauchy developments (M,  g,  i) of 


























The mghd [Mt , gt , it] is the top element of this poset [166] and so if some maximal development 
(Mm, gm, im) à la Chruściel is globally hyperbolic then [Mm, gm, im] ≤ [Mt , gt , it] . On the other hand, since 
(Mt , gt , it) is a solution and (Mm, gm, im) is maximal also the converse holds, so (Mm, gm, im) ≅ (Mt , gt , it).
53 See Doboszewski [63, 64] and Manchak [131, 132] for conceptual studies of the (in)extendibility of 
space–times.
54 As pointed out to me by Julius Doboszewski, Chruściel et al. [43] as well as Chruściel and Isenberg 
[42] only consider smooth extensions, so that looking at lower regularity seems a refinement postdating 
this early phase.
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suggested that because of a blueshift instability of the Cauchy horizon under pertur-
bations, it turns into a curvature singularity:
Our contention in this note is that if the initial data is generically perturbed 
then the Cauchy horizon does not survive as a non-singular hypersurface. It 
is strongly implied that instead, genuine space–time singularities will appear 
along the region which would otherwise have been the Cauchy horizon. [172, 
p. 184]
Since then, this instability has been confirmed in a large number of studies, starting 
with Hiscock [102] in the physics literature and Dafermos [51] in the mathematical 
one; recent papers include Chesler et  al. [24] and Van de Moortel [178], respec-
tively. The conclusion seems to be that Cauchy horizons turn into so-called weak 
null singularities,55 behind which—at least for one-ended asymptotically flat initial 
data—there is a strong curvature singularity at r = 0 . See also Luk and Oh [127, 
128] for the two-ended case. Unappealingly, the sense in which strong cosmic cen-
sorship (in the pde formulation) then fails or holds depends critically on the regular-
ity assumptions of the extension.56
For example, for two-ended asymptotically flat data for the spherically symmetric 
Einstein–Maxwell-scalar field system (to which the conjecture, so far discussed for 
the vacuum case, can be extended in the obvious way), the strong cosmic censor-
ship conjecture fails in C0 [60],57 but it holds in C0 with the additional requirement 
that the associated Christoffel symbols are locally L2 [127, 128]. This is not just a 
technicality, since having the metric in C0 and its Christoffel symbols locally L2 is 
a borderline regularity condition for metric extensions in strong cosmic censorship: 
it is the least regular case in which the metric can still be defined as a weak solu-
tion to Einstein’s equations [34, p. 9], [126, Footnote 1]. Indeed, a weak solution of 
the vacuum Einstein equations is a metric g for which for all compactly supported 
X, Y ∈ (M),
Partial integration shows that this is well defined iff the Γ are locally L2 . This sim-
ple observation should not be confused with the very deep result that having the 
Ricci tensor in L2 is sufficient for the (vacuum) Einstein equations to be weakly solv-
able at least locally [117]. Ironically, in Definition 3.3 of strong cosmic censorship 






55 These are null boundaries with C0 metric but Christoffel symbols not locally in L2 [126, 129].
56 The results below concern cosmological constant  = 0 and subextremal black holes (i.e. e2 < m2 for 
R–N and a2 < m2 for Kerr). See Dias et al. [62] for 𝜆 > 0 : strong cosmic censorship seems true in pure 
gravity and false for the Einstein–Maxwell system, but again this depends critically on the regularity of 
the extension. For extremal Reissner–Nordström ( e2 = m2 ) at  = 0 see Gajic and Luk [85], suggesting 
failure of strong cosmic censorship, as is trivially the case for e2 > m2.
57 Their general result assumes the (widely expected) stability of the Kerr metric under perturbations of 
the initial data.
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See also Ringström [156] for a review of the ‘cosmological’ case where the Cauchy 
surface is compact, in which the strong (pde) conjecture seems to hold.
The status of weak cosmic censorship is even less clear. Christodoulou [33] 
proves the conjecture for the spherically symmetric gravitational collapse of a scalar 
field, but on the basis of genericity conditions whose relevance has been questioned 
in the physics literature [94, §3.4]. More generally, the status of weak cosmic cen-
sorship seems mixed also in earlier heuristic formulations in terms of an event hori-
zon; see e.g. Joshi [110, 111], Królak [120, 121], and Ong [140].
4  Examples
The relationship between the Penrosian and the pde versions of the cosmic censor-
ship conjectures is best understood from three key black hole examples and their 
Penrose diagrams:58
• Maximally extended Schwarzschild (i.e. Kruskal) with m > 0 (and two-sided ini-
tial data);
• Schwarzschild with m < 0 , which in so far as singularities and horizons are con-
cerned also looks like supercharged Reissner–Nordström ( e2 > m2 > 0 ), or fast 
rotating Kerr ( a2 > m2 > 0);
• Reissner–Nordström with 0 < e2 < m2 , which qualitatively also represents Kerr 
with 0 < a2 < m2.
In the first case the solution coincides with the mghd of the corresponding (two-
ended) initial data, so the difference between the Penrosian and the pde approach 
evaporates. Here is the Penrose diagram:
58 Even more so than the previous sections this one is purely pedagogical and drawn largely from Hawk-
ing and Ellis [98, pp. 158 and 160], as well as from Dafermos and Rodnianski [61] and Dafermos [53–
57] for the pde side.
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Penrose diagram of the maximally extended Schwarzschild solution with m > 0 . 
This solution coincides with the maximal Cauchy development (marked in light 
grey) of a generic two-sided Cauchy surface Σ with suitable initial data, drawn as 
a horizontal blue line. Thus the Cauchy horizon H ±
C
 is empty. The upper two green 
lines form the future event horizon H +
E
 of the black hole area, which is the upside-
down upper triangle (labeled region II), whereas the lower two green lines form the 
past event horizon H −
E
 of the white hole area, i.e. the lower triangle (region IV). 
The right-hand diamond is region I, the left-hand diamond is region III. Fd causal 
curves cannot leave region II and they cannot enter region IV.
Both cosmic censorship conjectures hold in both versions (i.e. Penrose and pde):
• Weak cosmic censorship. Penrose: Σ is a Cauchy surface for J−(I+) , making it 
globally hyperbolic.59 pde: each component of I+ ends at timelike infinity and 
hence all its null geodesics are future complete (as confirmed by explicit para-
metrization and computation).
• Strong cosmic censorship. Penrose: Kruskal space–time is globally hyperbolic 
(since the causal structure of the diagram is such that the line Σ represents a 
Cauchy surface). pde: For smooth extensions Remark 5.45 on p. 155 of O’Neill 
[139] or Proposition 4.4.3 in Chruściel [39] plus a detailed study of the geodesics 
shows that Kruskal space–time is metrically inextendible.60
59 Alternatively: any incomplete future inextendible timelike curve  must crash in the upper r = 0 sin-
gularity. Hence I−() lies partly in region II, which is disjoint from J−(I+) , so that I−(𝛾) ⊈ J−(x) for all 
x ∈ J−(I+).
60 If for any maximally extended timelike geodesic  ∶ [0, b) → M in M there is a curvature invariant 
(such as R or RR , etc.) that blows up as (t) → b , then (M, g) is inextendible. See O’Neill [139, 
Chap. 13], for a study of Kruskal geodesics, proving the antecedent. Sbierski [167, 168] proves that 
Kruskal space–time is inextendible even in C0.
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However, for m < 0 Kruskal, Reissner–Nordström, and Kerr, differences arise 
between the Penrosian and the pde perspectives, since in these cases the maximal 
(analytic) solutions, deemed unphysical by the pde aficionados, differ from the mghd 
of the pertinent initial data. In particular, although (curvature) singularities are not 
part of space–time in any case, they can at least be drawn as boundaries in the maxi-
mal solutions, where they lie behind a Cauchy horizon. But precisely for that reason 
singularities are outside any kind of scope of the corresponding mghd. Here are the 
Penrose diagrams:
Left picture: Penrose diagram of m < 0 Schwarzschild, or supercharged Reiss-
ner–Nordström ( e2 > m2 > 0 ), or fast Kerr ( a2 > m2 > 0 ). These solutions have a 
singularity at r = 0 , but unlike the m > 0 Kruskal case it is not shielded by an event 
horizon. Instead, the red lines labeled H −
E
 and H +
E
 are past and future Cauchy 
horizons with respect to the blue line, indicating a maximal spacelike surface whose 
initial data give rise to the metrics in question and whose maximal Cauchy develop-
ment is the grey area.
Right picture: Penrose diagram of subcritical Reissner–Nordström ( 0 < e2 < m2 ), 
whose event and Cauchy horizons (despite the different structure of the singularity) 
also resemble those of slowly rotating Kerr ( 0 < a2 < m2 ). The maximal Cauchy 
development of the pertinent initial data given on the maximal spacelike hypersur-
face represented by the blue line labeled Σ is again colored in grey. It contains past 
and future event horizons labeled H −
E
 and H +
E
 , drawn in green, but unlike the m > 0 
Schwarzschild case the singularity they are supposed to shield cannot be reached 
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directly from the maximal Cauchy development, which is bounded by the various ficti-
tious boundaries J± , i± , and i0 , which lie at infinity, as well as by the Cauchy horizons 
H ±
C
 , drawn in red, which can be reached in finite proper time.61
Despite the different space–times they apply to, the outcomes of the Penrosian 
version and the pde version of both weak and strong cosmic censorship are once 
again the same, mutatis mutandis:62
• m < 0 Kruskal (etc.): for the Penrosian total space–time the difference between 
weak and strong cosmic censorship fades since J−1(I+) = M ∪I+ , which, like 
M itself is not globally hyperbolic: wherever one tries to place a partial Cauchy 
surface Σ (such as the blue line), above the surface inextendible causal curves 
can be drawn that enter i+ or I+ in the future and enter the singularity at r = 0 
in the past, without crossing Σ . Similarly, below Σ one may draw inextendible 
causal curves converging to the singularity in the future, and to i− or I− in the 
past, which once again do not cross Σ . Thus neither weak nor strong cosmic cen-
sorship holds for this space–time.
  The pde picture applies to the grey area, which is the mghd of the initial data 
given on the blue line marked Σ in the left-hand Penrose diagram. Then weak 
cosmic censorship fails because future null infinity I+ is clearly incomplete: null 
geodesics terminate at the Cauchy horizon (where they “fall off’ space–time) and 
hence are incomplete. On the other hand, strong cosmic censorship fails because 
the grey space–time, though globally hyperbolic (in contrast with the entire 
space as we have just seen), is evidently (smoothly—even analytically) extend-
ible, namely by the total space. Though they do not coincide, we see that strong 
and weak cosmic censorship are closely related: future incompleteness of null 
geodesics at null infinity happens because the mghd is extendible.
• Subcritical Reissner–Nordström ( 0 < e2 < m2 ): for both Penrose and the pde 
people strong cosmic censorship fails whereas the weak version holds. In the 
Penrosian version the total space fails to be globally hyperbolic because of the 
part above the grey area (i.e. beyond the future Cauchy horizon H +
E
 ): one has 
past-directed inextendible causal curves that (backwards in time) end up in the 
singularity and hence never cross Σ (e.g. those crossing the upper left, NW-point-
ing red line from N to SW). Morally, weak cosmic censorship holds because of 
the future event horizon H +
E
 , which shields the upper r = 0 singularity above it, 
but legally this is only the case if we stop the Penrose diagram at the past Cauchy 
horizon H −
E
 , as we have done in drawing the picture (for otherwise causal curves 
below it may crash at the lower r = 0 singularity and hence never reach Σ).
61 This diagram can be infinitely extended in both directions [98, pp. 158, 165]: to the north, another 
grey area folds inside the upper two red line segments, and similarly to the south, et cetera, but we do not 
do so here.
62 For m < 0 Kruskal the initial data are not complete in this case, so strictly speaking the cosmic cen-
sorship conjectures do not apply here and their falsity is unimportant. Nonetheless, they can be stated 
and the comparison is instructive.
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  The pde view is cleaner here: roughly speaking, as in the m > 0 Kruskal or 
Schwarzschild case (but unlike the m < 0 case) future null infinity I+ ends at 
future timelike infinity i+ and hence is complete, so that weak cosmic censor-
ship holds. Strong cosmic censorship, on the other hand, fails because the mghd 
(marked in grey) is clearly extendible (namely into the Penrosian space–time!).
More generally, if the strong Penrosian conjecture fails for some space–time 
(MP, gP) , then its lack of global hyperbolicity typically occurs because (MP, gP) is 
an extension of the mghd (M, g) of some given initial data, whose Cauchy surface 
Σ fails to be one for (MP, gP) . Similarly, if J−1(I
+) is not globally hyperbolic (so 
that there is a naked singularity), MP usually comes from extending some (M, g), as 
above, whose Cauchy surface becomes a partial Cauchy surface in MP , with an asso-
ciated future Cauchy horizon that cuts off I+ ∩ M̃ , causing its incompleteness.63 As 
already mentioned, any counterexamples are believed to be “non-generic”, assuming 
of course that the conjectures hold!
Such reasoning, which applies to many case studies, also suggests a compromise 
between the Penrosian and pde versions of cosmic censorship: informally one might 
say that, in “physically reasonable” space–times, weak cosmic censorship postulates 
the appearance and stability of event horizons, whereas strong cosmic censorship 
requires the instability and ensuing disappearance of Cauchy horizons.
5  Epilogue: Penrose’s Final State Conjecture
In practice, the cosmic censorship conjectures are not put in the full generality of 
either Penrose’s own version as expressed by Theorem 3.2 or of the pde version as 
Definition 3.3, but are posed in the context of black holes as they are expected to 
occur in the universe, i.e. as described by something like the Kerr metric (at least 
outside its Cauchy horizon and more safely even outside its event horizon). As such, 
on the one hand they gain focus, but on the other hand they can be thought of as 
forming part of a broader conjecture that also originated with Penrose himself and is 
often called the final state conjecture:64
A body, or collection of bodies, collapses down to a size comparable to its 
Schwarzschild radius, after which a trapped surface can be found in the region 
surrounding the matter. Some way outside the trapped surface region is a sur-
face which will ultimately be the absolute event horizon. But at present, this 
surface is still expanding somewhat. Its exact location is a complicated affair 
63 However, these aren’t rigorous deductions: there are pathological cases where strong cosmic censor-
ship holds whilst the weak version fails. See the Penrose diagram at the end of §2.6.2 of Dafermos and 
Rodnianski [61] for an example.
64 This is sometimes stated somewhat differently, in that ‘generic asymptotically flat vacuum initial data 
(...) evolve to a solution which either disperses (in which case there are no black holes) or else eventually 
asymptotes to finitely many Kerr solutions (...) moving away from each other’ [47, p. 78]. See also the 
fascinating lecture by Klainerman [113].
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and it depends on how much more matter (or radiation) ultimately falls in. We 
assume only a finite amount falls in and that gic is true. Then the expansion of 
the absolute event horizon gradually slows down to stationarity. Ultimately the 
field settles down to becoming a Kerr solution (in the vacuum case) or a Kerr-
Newman solution (if a nonzero net charge is trapped in the “black hole”). [147, 
pp. 1157–1158]
Here gic refers to what Penrose [147] called the Generalized Israel Conjecture,65 
which states that:
if an absolute event horizon develops in an asymptotically flat space–time, 
then the solution exterior to this horizon approaches a Kerr-Newman solution 
asymptotically with time. [147, pp. 1156]
In the stationary case, which is what Israel himself conjectured and proved under 
fairly restrictive assumptions, this would simply say that the solution exterior to this 
horizon equals a Kerr–Newman solution. As such, the conjecture is an outgrowth of 
what (following Wheeler) used to be called the “no hair” property of black holes, to 
the effect that stationary black holes (and eventually all black holes) are character-
ized by by just three parameters, viz. mass, angular momentum, and electric charge. 
As such, the final state conjecture incorporates not only weak cosmic censorship 
(notably in the compromise version suggested at the end of the previous section) but 
also what in the pde literature is called Kerr stability, as well as Kerr rigidity. The 
former is the conjecture that generic perturbations of the initial data for the Kerr 
metric lead to a mghd that is close to the original one (at least outside the event hori-
zon).66 This would generalize the remarkable theorem on the stability of Minkowski 
space–time [35], which launched the modern era in pde-oriented mathematical 
relativity. The latter is a more modest version of the no-hair or black hole unique-
ness theorems of Israel, Carter, Hawking, Robinson, and others,67 where short of 
proving the stationary case of the above gic, which requires unphysical analyticity 
assumptions, one tries to show that at least stationary solutions to Einstein’s vacuum 
(electrovac) equations that are close to Kerr (–Newman) actually coincide with the 
latter.68
In conclusion, “the discovery that black hole formation is a robust prediction of 
the general theory of relativity” still lies in the future as far as mathematical proof is 
concerned. Penrose’s Nobel Prize was effectively awarded for a theorem and a con-
jecture, but it was fully deserved in every conceivable way!
65 The reference is to Israel [106, 107]. See Israel [109, §7.9] and Thorne [175, Chap. 7], for interesting 
history.
66 There is certain numerical evidence for this (Zilhão et al. 2014), but mathematical results so far are 
preliminary [59, 91], except for positive cosmological constant and small a [101], where the problem is 
solved. Even the Schwarzschild case is still open, despite impressive progress [58, 118].
67 These theorems are reviewed in Hawking and Ellis [98, §9.3], [21, 22], Heusler [99], Robinson [160], 
Chruściel et al. [44], and Cederbaum [23]. See also Cardoso and Gualtieri [17] for possible tests.
68 See e.g. Alexakis et al. [3] as well as the review by Ionescu and Klainerman [105].
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Appendix: A Potted Early History of “black hole” (by Erik Curiel)
In reply to a query in an early draft of this paper concerning the origin of the defi-
nitions B ∶= M�J−(I+) of a black hole (region) and of the event horizon as its 
boundary H +
E
∶= B , see (2.4) and (2.5), phrased as: ‘Such definitions are rou-
tinely used in e.g. Carter [18] and Hawking and Ellis [98, §9.2], but who stated them 
first?’, Erik Curiel very kindly supplied the following information.69 As we see, the 
question still remains somewhat open. A puzzling point is that although Penrose 
himself would have been the obvious person to state these definitions mathemati-
cally, apparently he did not do so!
Penrose [146] defines (p. 188), an event horizon as the boundary of the chron-
ological past of a timelike curve (essentially the same definition, including the 
name, as given by [155]), and notes (p. 206) that r = 2M in Schwarzschild 
is one. The term “black hole” does not appear in that essay, nor any defini-
tion remotely like ‘the complement of the causal past of future null infinity’. 
Given the magisterial depth and encyclopedic scope of that essay, I must con-
clude that the definition was not then yet extant. Penrose [147] does use the 
term “black hole” (the first use of it I know in the general relativity literature, 
though it reportedly was used in the early 1960s by Dicke in discussion with a 
popular science writer), but he always encloses it in scare quotes, leading me 
to believe that the name and the general concept both were still inchoate. This 
is buttressed by the fact that he does give here (p. 1146, Footnote 3) the classic 
definition of an ‘absolute event horizon’ (the boundary of the chronological 
past of future null infinity), but he does not explicitly link it to the term “black 
hole”. That is the first appearance of the classic definition I know of in the 
literature.
Ruffini and Wheeler gave a series of lectures in September 1969 at the Inter-
laken Colloquium on the Significance of Space Research for Fundamental 
Physics (Interlaken, Switzerland), one of which was entitled ‘Black Holes’, at 
least according to the expanded version of the lectures published as Ruffini 
and Wheeler [161], from which Ruffini and Wheeler [162] was adapted. This 
is the first use of the term I have been able to find recorded in a public forum 
in the relativity community. They explain the idea in informal, intuitive terms. 
Bardeen [11], received 23 January 1970, has “black hole” in the title, the first 
publication I know of to do so. He introduces “black hole” using scare quotes 
and equates it with a ‘collapsed object’. Israel [108], originally read at the 
Gwatt Seminar on the Bearings of Topology upon General Relativity on 19 
May 1970, uses “black hole” without defining it, but it is clear from context 
that he means something like ‘system that quickly settles down so that its exte-
rior is modeled by the Kerr solution’. Christodoulou [30], received 17 Sep-
tember 1970, uses the term without blushing, not even an informal gloss given 
69 As in the rest of the paper, single quotation marks below denote literal quotation whereas double ones 
are scare quotes.
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for its meaning. He simply begins by talking of a ‘black hole [with] angular 
momentum’ without even citing Kerr [112]. Three papers then appear in 1971 
with “black hole” in the title, Penrose and Floyd [151], received 16 December 
1970, Carter [19], received 18 December 1970, and Hawking [96], received 
11 March 1971. They are the only other papers from 1971 I can find related to 
the topic whose authors plausibly could have proposed the classic definition. 
Penrose and Floyd [151] uses scare-quotes around the first use of “black hole”; 
their discussion relies only on the event horizon and ergosphere (which they 
refer to as the ‘stationary limit’) defined by the Kerr metric, with no attempt 
at (or mention of the possibility of) generalization. Carter [19] does not give 
a formal definition of “black hole”, but he does give an informal definition of 
‘domain of outer communication’, and says (p. 331) that ‘ “black holes” [are] 
regions of space–time beyond the domain of outer communication.’ Note the 
scare-quotes. Hawking [96] uses scare-quotes as well, going out of his way 
to assimilate the idea of a black hole to one more widely known (‘there are 
initially two collapsed objects or “black holes” ’, p. 1345). He also comes ach-
ingly close to defining a black hole as a connected component of the comple-
ment of the causal past of future null infinity, but never quite does it. He rather 
says things like, ‘On Σi [a spacelike hypersurface], there will be two separate 
regions, B1 and B2 which contain closed, trapped surfaces (...) Just outside B1 
and B2 will be two two-spheres which are the intersection of J̇−(I
+) with Σi .’ 
The first explicit definition I know of “black hole” as ‘connected component of 
the complement of the causal past of future null infinity’ is in Hawking [97]. 
But I am not confident that I have found all relevant sources in the literature; 
even if I have, one cannot be confident based only on this that Hawking was 
the one who finally put all the pieces together.
(Erik Curiel, private communication, January 6, 2021, reprinted with permis-
sion)
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